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RECENT DECISIONS
Bankruptcy-Effect of Receipt of Note as Evidence of, or in Payment
of, a Tort Claim Otherwise Barred from Discharge in Bankruptcy -
Plaintiff finance company loaned certain sums to the Auto Service
Sales Company, a corporation managed by the defendants. The loan
was secured by certain automobiles in possession of the sales company.
Upon discovering several false representations by the defendants con-
cerning the extent of this security plaintiff complained and the de-
fendants as corporate officers executed a cognovit note containing an
additional personal guaranty by each of the defendants. Plaintiff ob-
tained a judgment on the note and instituted a subsequent garnishment
action which was stayed to await the final determination of defendants'
bankruptcy proceedings. After defendants' discharge in bankruptcy
the garnishment action was continued; defendants claimed there had
been a discharge of the liability. Held: The court may not go behind the
record of the first judgment to determine the nature of defendants'
liability; and acceptance of a note for a liability, which may have
sounded in tort, waived the tort and reduced the liability to one upon
contract. Swano Finance Corporation v. Haase, 252 Wis. 12, 30 N.W.
(2d) 82, (1947).
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that certain classifica-
tions of provable debts shall be exempt from discharge.' The nature
of these exceptions indicates a Congressional intention to relieve the
honest debtor from his financial obligations, but that certain liabilities
originating from a degree of moral turpitude should not be discharged
by proceedings under the Act. The statute is remedial and should
in general be construed in favor of the bankrupt debtor,2 however, a
question arises whether this approach should be used when a liability
exempt from discharge under Section 17 is changed in form to a
liability that would ordinarily be discharged. Where a judgment is
obtained upon a tort claim it is uniformly held that the court will
look behind the judgment to determine whether the judgment lebtor
'U.S.C.A., sec. 35(a) as amended June 22, 1938, c. 575, sec. 1, 52 Stat. 851,
which contains the following provisions concerning tort liability: "A discharge
in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts .....
except such as ..... (2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property by
false pretenses or false representation, or for willful and malicious injuries
to the person or property of another ...... (4) where created by his fraud,
embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer oi
in any fiduciary capacity; ......
21n re Noble, (D.C. Colo. 1941) 42 F.Supp. 684; Shepard v. McDonald, (C.C.A.
9th, 1946) 157 Fed.(2d) 467.
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is discharged3 and this depends upon whether the tort is a wilful or
malicious wrong.4
If instead of a reduction to a judgment a note is accepted as evi-
dence of, or in payment of, a tort claim the courts are willing to go
behind the note to determine the nature of liability. The preponderance
of decisions indicate that the note is a mere acknowledgment of the
tort, therefore a waiver of the tort liability has not been made and
the tort may be alleged upon a suit based on the note.5 In one case
where a waiver was found the court held the action was nevertheless
not barred,6 presumably because of the policy behind the Bankruptcy
Act.7 Wisconsin, however, indicates an adherence to the strict doctrine
of waiver, but it may not have fully considered the problem. In the
principal case8 the decision rests partially upon a waiver of tort liability
upon acceptance of the note. Plaintiff's briefs stated that no waiver
had been intended, but the Court held adversely with little discussion.
The Court points out that a party having an action in either tort or
contract and suing upon contract can not thereafter recover damages
on tort.9 It is felt that this rule should not bar allegations of tort
coupled with a suit upon the note so as to limit the application of
Section 17 and the intent of Congress.
Another group of cases is where a judgment is obtained upon the
note prior to bankruptcy, presenting a dual intervention between the
original liability and the force of discharge. The weight of authority
will allow the court to look behind the judgment to the record in order
to determine whether there was a discharge.' 0 A minority view holds
3 6 Am. Jur. 830, Bankruptcy, sec. 528. ". . . The court will look behind thejudgment and consider the entire record; and the actual fact disclosed thereby
as the basis for the liability of the judgment debtor will govern." Globe In-
demnity Co. v. Granskov, 246 Wis. 87, at 91; 16 N.W. (2d) 437 (1944).
4 Globe Indemnity Co. v. Granskov, supra, (judgment based upon negligent
performance of ones duties as deputy discharged); In re Wegner, (C.C.A.
7th, 1937), 88 Fed.(2d) 899, (judgment on negligent driving discharged);
Re Pacer, (D.C. N.Y. 1934), 5 F.Supp. 439, (judgment on assault and battery
not discharged).
5 Symmes v. Rollins, 39 Ga. App. 53, 146 S.E. 42, (1928); Madison Twp. v.
Dunkle, 114 Ind. 262, 16 N.E. 593, (1888) ; Field v. Howry, 132 Mich. 687, 94
N.W. 213, (1903); Gregory v. Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 189 P. 932, (1920);
Blumberg v. Henne Co., Tex. Civ. App., 5 S.W.(2d) 1015, (1928); Guernsey
Newton Co. v. Napier, 151 Wash. 318, 275 P. 724, (1929); Brown v. Hanna-
gan, 210 Mass. 246, 96 N.E. 714, (1911) ; Donahue v. Conley, 85 Cal. App. 15,
258 P. 985, (1927); Kilbourn v. Mechanics Loan & S. Co., 175 Ga. 146, 165
S.E. 76, (1932).6 Mathewson v. Naylor, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 741, 64 P. (2d) 979, (1937).
7Supra, note 1.8 Shawno Finance Co. v. Haase, 252 Wis. 12, 30 N.W. (2d) 82, (1947).
9 The Court cited Huganir v. Cotter, 102 Wis. 323, 78 N.W. 423, (1899), where
the Brankruptcy Act was not involved.10 Rice v. Guider, 275 Mich. 14, 265 N.W. 777, (1936) ; Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v.
Gardner, 315 Mich. 689, 24 N.W.(2d) 410, (1946); Donald v. Kell, 111 Ind.
1, 11 N.E. 782, (1887); Aetna Casualty and S. Co. v. Sentilles, La. App.,
1948]
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the judgment on a note to be a waiver of the tort,"' thus restricting the.
court to the judgment alone. Connecticut has recently overruled an
earlier decision upholding the minority view and allowed the creditor
to present evidence outside of either the judgment or the record in
order to determine the nature of the debt. In this instance the Court
argued that it is an accepted principle that one may go behind a note
and that a judgment does not alter the character of indebtedness, there-
fore evidence extraneous to the record should not be precluded; to do
so would be to defeat the intention of Congress."2 Wisconsin is in
accord with the weight of authority, 3 but incidental findings of tort
appearing in the record will not bar a discharge.14
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Federal Taxation-Ownership for Federal Income Tax Purposes and
for Federal Gift Tax Purposes Distinguished - Taxpayer created two ir-
revocable trusts, with others as trustees, consisting of a securities trad-
ing account to be managed and operated under his direction for the
benefit of his three children. Taxpayer reserved the right to use the
corpus for marginal trading. It was provided that he would make
good any losses which resulted from such trading out of his own
earnings, and such losses were to be made good to him out of the first
profits that accrued from future transactions. The litigation involved
taxpayer's gift tax liability as grantor of the trusts for the marginal
trading profits. Held: The marginal trading profits are not taxable
gifts as they accrued immediately and directly to the trusts. Taxpayer
had no economic interest in such profits, and any losses suffered would
have been suffered by the trusts. What taxpayer contributed were his
services which he could withhold at any time, but he could not with-
hold any of the profits accruing from the marginal trading. Taxpayer
can not give what he can not withhold. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.
(2d) 352 (C.C.A. 10, 1947).
160 S. 1949, (1935); Bronx County Trust Co. v. Cassin, 170 Misc. 962, 10
N.Y.S.(2d) 986, (1939); Scott v. Corn, Tex. Civ. App., 19 S.W.(2d) 412,
(1929).
-1 Ford v. Blackshear Mfg. Co., 140 Ga. 670, 79 S.E. 576, (1913) ; Consolidated
Plan v. Bonitatibus, 130 Conn. 199, 33 A.(2d) 140, (1943).
12 Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Golombosky, 133 Conn. 317, 51 A. (2d) 817,
(1946).
13 Shawno Finance Co. v. Haase, supra. "It is true that in determining whether
the liability of a judgment debtor is dischargeable in bankruptcy under Sec-
tion 17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the court will look behind the judgment
and consider the entire record, and the actual fact disclosed thereby as the
basis for adjudicating liability will govern.", Estate of Weil, 249 Wis. 385,
24 N.W. 662, (1946).
14 Klatt v. Helming, 248 Wis. 139, 21 N.W. (2d) 261, (1945).
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